Drawing on recent advances in the study of reference dependent utility we model financial markets as a coordination game with multiple equilibria. Asset valuations may change endogenously through re-coordination which induces fluctuations in output. These fluctuations are shown to be quantitatively relevant and inefficient.
Introduction
In this model we show that introducing fully rational but loss (inequity) averse investors into a growth model creates multiple equilibria on financial markets. We can pick equilibria that display financial market anomalies and trace out their effects on the other endogenous variables.
It has been observed for quite some time that the properties a stochastic discount factor would have to have to generate the asset prices observed in reality cannot easily be reconciled with the predictions made by the consumption based approach to asset pricing (Lucas 1978) . One important anomaly is that expected returns of many assets are time-varying and therefore predictable (e.g. Fama and French 1988) , while according to the CCAPM they should be constant over time given that consumption growth is roughly i.i.d..
These anomalies have stimulated a rich body of theoretical research. Most importantly models that suggest that they result from the reaction of rational investors with non standard preferences, exhibiting e.g. habit formation (Campbell and Cochrane 1999) or loss aversion (Barberis et al 2001) , to uncertainty concerning consumption and dividends. These models are silent as to what drives consumption and dividends, they are simply taken as exogenous.
The habit formation approach has even been extended to an economy with a non trivial production sector by Boldrin et al. (2001) . Here consumption and dividends are no longer exogenous but are simultaneously determined in equilibrium by the actions of consumers and producers reacting to an exogenous productivity shock. This model turns out not only to be consistent with observed asset pricing data but has also to have appealing business cycle implications.
All these approaches have in common that they stipulate that all the uncertainty in the economy originates in the production sector (ultimately productivity shocks) and that output and investment levels as well as asset prices are an efficient reaction to these shocks.
A different view seems to be held by many economists when discussing policy issues. Regarding the question wether central banks should consider asset prices when setting monetary policy a CEPR report (Cechetti et al. 2000) concludes that "Asset price misalignments may be difficult to measure, but this is no reason to ignore them." Addressing the question whether While none of these arguments has been made in the form of a rigorous model the quotes seem to suggest that there are endogenous changes in the consumer's evaluation of certain assets that influence output, consumption and dividends. Moreover, these changes are considered to be inefficient and to require policy interventions. This view, however, is not consistent with any of the models we have described so far.
In the following we present a model that formalizes the intuition described above. Our economy is populated by agents with rational expectations but non standard preferences. The preferences we suggest are a combination of loss aversion as used by Barberis et al (2001) and relative income concerns as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . Like in the model of Barberis et al (2001) our agents derive utility from two components: One is standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility from consumption. The second is a psychological loss if their consumption drops below a reference point. However, in this model the reference point is not defined backward looking as in Barberis et al (2001) but is set by the contemporaneous consumption of peers.
This induces a preference to hold the same portfolio as one's peers. We get multiple equilibria in which it is individually optimal to hold a portfolio that does not maximize utility from consumption as long as everybody else does so as well. Switching from one equilibrium to another creates endogenous changes in the valuation of assets. The resulting equilibria may be inefficient.
Everybody would prefer to coordinate on the portfolio that maximizes utility from consumption.
By plugging these preferences into a growth model we can investigate the qualitative and quantitative effects of changes in asset valuations on investment and output. A thorough analysis of these effects is beyond the scope of this paper but we demonstrate the methodology using a simple example.
Section 2 introduces inequity aversion and draws on recent theory and experimental evidence to justify it. In Section 3 we lay out the basic model, Section 4 characterizes the equilibria and Section 5 presents a simple calibrated example economy. Section 6 concludes.
Investor Preferences
In recent years doubts have grown that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is an adequate description of human behavior under uncertainty. There is not only experimental evidence that is at odds with expected utility theory but also has Rabin (2000) shown that expected utility cannot simultaneously explain observed behavior towards small and large gambles.
The marginal utilities in case of winning or losing a small gamble are almost the same and the risk premium is almost zero unless there is a lot of curvature in the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. A sufficient amount of curvature, however, would imply an unreasonably high risk premium for larger gambles.
A solution to this puzzle offers the concept of loss aversion, which has been formulated by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) as a building block of their prospect theory. It introduces a psychological cost that people suffer the further their payoff in an isolated gamble falls below a reference point.
The utility function exhibits a kink at the reference point.
This creates a large risk premium for small gambles around the reference point without strongly affecting the risk premia of larger gambles. An implementation of loss aversion is the utility function of Barberis et al (2001) . It consists of two elements: A standard von Neumann-Morgenstern part defined over consumption plus an additive loss aversion term.
Loss aversion can also explain why in experiments people evaluate the same lottery differently depending on how it is framed. Different frames may induce different reference points.
While in experimental settings there is often a suggestive reference point, no consensus has emerged as to how people choose their reference points in more complex environments. The applied literature relies on plausibility arguments. In an asset pricing context Barberis et al (2001) suggest that investors experience a loss if the value of their portfolio falls below the value it had a year ago augmented by the risk-free rate.
In this paper we employ a different approach to defining the reference level by making use of relative income concerns, a concept which dates back at least to Veblen (1922) . In every state of the world the reference point depends on the consumption of members of a reference group. Intuitively, this implies that if everybody gets rich in a bull market an investor who gets the risk-free rate will suffer a utility loss while he does not if he manages to just preserve his capital in a stock market crash where everybody else loses out.
The utility function has three parameters: α is a parameter that indicates the strength of the inequity aversion, B is the discount factor and γ the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Let c i be the consumption of consumer i and c j the consumption of one member of his reference group then the expected utility of consumer i is given by
An advantage of this functional form is that the exchange rate between money and inequity is independent of wealth and depends only on the value of α.
Under certainty this utility function collapses into a monotone transformation of the one introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) who have used it to explain a broad array of seemingly contradictory results in experimental game theory. They use an explicit distribution of α's among the population, which is shown to be consistent with the experimental data. Due to the functional form we have chosen we can directly compare the values of α necessary to generate the effects in our model with their calibration.
The main effect of this preference specification is that agents dislike taking risks that are not taken by their reference group. Because the psychological loss from inequity is a first order effect while the effect on utility from consumption is not, the agents will prefer to be fully insured against inequity as long as the necessary portfolio choice does not distort their consumption path by too much.
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We do not want to go so far as to argue that people choose their reference points always and exclusively by looking at a reference group. We rather think the more complicated the environment and the less obvious a reference point is the more likely it is that people look at other people to determine whether they are at a loss or not. One and the same person may use different reference points in different situations.
An advantage of inequity aversion is that it allows us to address a broad range of anomalies in so diverse fields as game theory and asset pricing in a unified framework. This addresses a major objection many economists have to behavioral models, namely that any behavior can easily be explained by a model if we allow the utility function to be tailored to a specific problem.
1 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have a second component in their utility function which results in a utility loss if there is inequity in favor of the agent. Assuming such preferences even strengthens our arguments as an investor would not only suffer in the states of the world in which he is worse off than his reference group but also in those states of the world in which he is better off. We neglect this effect for ease of exposition.
The model we use is a standard growth model. It is populated by a continuum of identical consumers of measure one. The consumers exhibit inequity aversion and compare themselves to all other consumers. 2 Consumer i evaluates a consumption stream with the following utility function:
is produced using labor (N t ) and capital (K t−1 ) with a CobbDouglas production technology:
We fix labor input at N t = 1. There is labor augmenting technical progress so that Z t grows at rate g. Capital depreciates at rate δ.
We assume adjustment costs for investment. Let F (·) denote an installation function and I t investment in period t. ThenÎ t the amount by which the capital stock is increased through investment in period t is given bŷ
For the adjustment costs to be convex it must hold that F > 0 and F < 0.
Moreover, we assume
In the steady state g + δ is the investment-capital ratio. The assumptions guarantee that the steady state in the model with adjustment costs is the same as in the model without.
The capital accumulation equation is then given by
K t = (1 − δ)K t−1 + K t−1 F I t K t−1(3)
Equilibria
In this section we want to characterize the equilibria of the above described
model. An equilibrium is a law of motion for the capital stock that fulfills the following conditions. First, the resource constraint, i.e. the capital accumulation equation (3) together with the production function (2). Second, individual optimality for each agent. It must be optimal for him to hold his share of the capital stock. Here we deviate from the standard model as each investor takes the consumption of all other investors into account and individual investment has to be optimal given not only the expected return but also given the actions of the other investors. There will be multiple equilibria and we will characterize the set of equilibria by giving an algorithm to construct them.
We start constructing an equilibrium by assuming that in equilibrium every investor in every period t invests the same amount so that all agents share the same consumption process {C * t }.
3 It follows that individual per period utility is kinked at C * t the amount that everybody else consumes in equilibrium in period t.
This kink results from a jump in the marginal utility of per period consumption at the consumption level C * t . When consuming less than C * t the agent suffers a psychological loss because he consumes less than everybody else in his peer group. Increasing consumption reduces this loss. This is equivalent to an increase in marginal utility. At C * t this effect suddenly disappears and increasing consumption beyond this point only increases utility from consumption but does not influence the psychological component of utility.
For the stochastic process of consumption {C * t } to be an equilibrium it must be the case that in each pair of periods t and t + 1 no agent can increase his utility by shifting consumption from period t to period t + 1 or viceversa.
This is the case if the following conditions hold:
and
In equilibrium the individual agent consumes the same amount as everybody else and is therefore exactly at the kink. If he decreases consumption in period t and increases it in period t + 1 then he falls behind in period t and suffers a loss. More precisely the consumption lost in period t gives him 1 + α times marginal utility of consumption. In t + 1 he is ahead and the additional consumption gives him only his marginal utility.
Hence, inequity aversion makes the agent less willing to deviate by investing more a fact that is captured by inequality (4). Similarly, the agent is less willing to deviate by investing less because he would suffer in period t + 1 from falling behind everybody else. This is reflected in inequality (5).
We have indeed constructed an equilibrium if {C * t } fulfills inequalities (4) and (5). There are a range of consumption processes that can be supported as an equilibrium. The model does not make a prediction which path is chosen but it does provide limits on how far consumption (and therefore capital) can deviate from the standard growth model. We can in principle exploit this fact in a calibration exercise to get an idea how strong the inequity aversion has to be to generate sizeable aggregate results.
Finally, note that in equilibrium everybody consumes the same amount and there is no psychological loss from inequity. Therefore, we we can make a standard welfare analysis by only looking at utility from consumption. One can see that there is a welfare loss associated with every deviation from the consumption path that would result from α = 0.
Calibration
In this section we demonstrate with a simple example how one can pick an equilibrium and calibrate the model. This example was chosen to keep the computational difficulties to a minimum. It is not intended to be a thorough analysis of financial market anomalies and their consequences for the rest of the economy which would be beyond the scope of this paper.
Consider a model populated by investors who do not exhibit inequity aversion but who have a random discount factorB t . Inspecting Inequalities (4) and (5) we observe that as long as for all t
the solution to this reduced form model is an equilibrium of the full model with inequity aversion.
We assume β = logB (lower case letters denote logs) follows
and the conditional distributions of βt chosen so that inequalities (6) are never violated.
This model is then log-linearized around the steady state and solved by the method of undetermined coefficients 4 to obtain an approximate linear law of motion for capital.
In addition we are also interested in the development of asset prices. Of particular interest will be the price of long-term equity. This asset does not exist in positive supply in this model as all firms are financed by one-period equity only. However, we can compute its shadow price from the Lucas asset pricing equation assuming that it is in zero net supply.
Long-term equity is constructed as an asset that pays the return of one period equity as a dividend (D t ) in each period:
Using results from Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Lettau (2003) one can show that the log dividend-price ratio
can approximately be written as a linear function of the state variables (k t−1 and β t ).
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To calibrate the model we take where possible the quarterly equivalent of the values chosen by Kydland and Prescott (1982) : In addition we take φ = 0.9 for the persistence of the shock to the discount rate. The adjustment costs are calibrated by choosing
Plugging these values into the model we can calculate the impulse response functions for a one percent shock to the discount rate that are shown in Figure 1 :
The model was solved and the impulse response functions were calculated using the "Toolkit" from Uhlig (1999) . α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 1 α = 4 30% 30% 30% 10% Table 1 : Distribution of α's in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) The dividend-price ratio drops mainly because of an increase in the asset price. 7 Reduced cost of capital induces an investment boom and the capital stock increases beyond its steady state size before it slowly reverts back. As a result of capital accumulation output increases.
How large an α do we need to support these effects as an equilibrium and how plausible is this amount of inequity aversion? Inspecting inequalities (6) we see that to support a deviation of x percent of the discount rate an α of x times 0.01 is needed. This implies that an individual is willing to pay x Euro Cent to avoid falling one Euro behind everybody in his reference group with probability one. We can compare these numbers with the distribution of α's obtained by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) from experimental data under certainty which are given in Table 1 . The numbers in Table 1 suggest that while 30% of the population are not at all inequity averse the other 70% exhibit inequity aversion that is fifty times larger than the one needed to support the above impulse responses. This calculation gives us some confidence that even in a richer model inequity aversion will lead to substantive aggregate effects.
Conclusion
We have shown that introducing investors whose preferences exhibit inequity aversion into a standard growth model we can support equilibria in which asset prices deviate from the standard prediction. These asset price changes lead to inefficient output fluctuations. A simple calibration exercise suggests that the aggregate effects are likely be quantitatively significant. It seems to be promising to enrich the model with a more detailed labor market and to look at equilibria in which the risk-premium is volatile to more thoroughly assess the qualitative and quantitative contribution of endogenous stock market volatility to the business cycle.
